BERKELEY UNIVERSITY SYMPOSIUM
“Voices from the First Republic of Việt Nam”
PRESIDENT NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM
&
THE FIRST REPUBLIC OF
VIỆT NAM
(1954-1963)
By
LÂM LỂ TRINH
Former RVN Ambassador to Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon and Jordan
(1960-1963)
In
1955, I left my post as President of the Appeals Court of Saigon, Republic of
South Việt Nam, to serve as Interior Minister in the Ngô Đình Diệm
administration. I stayed in this post
until my resignation in October 1960. Those five years of relative peace and
nation building for a country ravaged by colonialism and war and divided by the
Geneva Accords earned President Diệm the moniker of “Asia’s
Churchill” and the admiration of other South East Asian leaders.
My
first contact with the Ngô Đình family goes back to the 1940’s. Father Ngô Đình Thục, President Diệm’s older
brother, had been my Greek and Latin teacher at the Jesuit Secondary School in
Huế in Central Việt Nam. Diệm was already making a name for
himself then, calling for the abolition of the French Protectorate. Critical of
Bảo Đại’s apathy, he had resigned in
protest from his post as Interior Minister.
When
the Japanese withdrew from Việt Nam in 1945 and British troops moved in, I was a law
student in Hà Nội. North Việt Nam was in the throes of what
became known as the Famine of 1945 which killed an estimated 2 million
people. In the chaos that ensued the
end of the war, Hồ Chí Minh declared Viet Nam’s independence from
France. Việt Minh-led demonstrations were
held all over Hà Nội and nationalist sympathizers were hunted down and
killed. I decided it was time for me to leave Hà Nội. The Transindochina railway had been destroyed
by bombings so I walked and cycled my way to the south.
I met
Diệm and his
brother Nhu for the first time in 1953 in Vĩnh Long where I was president of
the tribunal. In May of the following year, Bảo Đại offered Diệm the post of
Prime Minister, and Diệm said he would accept only if he could have full
powers. Bảo Đại’s indecision and the increased
fighting with the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo sects were a drain on Diệm. Every
weekend, he drove down to Vĩnh Long to attend mass officiated by his older
brother, now Bishop Thục, and to seek his advice and moral support. Mgr Thục spoke freely
to me of his brothers’ frustration with
Bảo Đại.
As
1954 drew to a close, Diệm, deeply moved by the exodus of a million North
Vietnamese Catholics to the South, and bolstered by the support of US Cardinal
Spellman and the last minute rallying to his cause of Trình Minh Thế ’s Cao
Đài forces, made his move against Bảo Đại.
Ngô
Đình Diệm was a monarchist at heart and a mandarin by training and it was not
his intention to depose Bảo Đại. However, when Bảo Đại summoned him to Cannes, France,
with the intention of replacing him with Lê Văn Viễn, head of the infamous Bình
Xuyên, he was left with little choice.
Diệm was also a devout Catholic and the tragic fate of the Catholic
refugees from the North weighed heavily on his decision to unseat Bảo Đại. Diệm asked the
Revolutionary Committee, composed of Nguyễn Bảo Toàn, Hồ Hán Sơn, and Nhị Lang, to allow
General Nguyễn Văn Vỹ, a Bảo Đại faithful who tried to stop him
from taking power, to go into exile. A referendum,
held on October 23, 1955, put an end to the monarchy in Việt Nam and
established the Republic of South Việt Nam, with a president and vice
president elected by universal suffrage, and a National Assembly. The constitution of the First Republic of Việt Nam was
approved on October 26, 1955, a date since commemorated as National Day.
Diệm moved quickly
to expel General Nguyễn Văn Hinh from the Army, wipe out the remnants of the
Bình Xuyên and neutralize the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo sects. He then declared that
South Việt Nam would not hold the elections that had been scheduled for 1956 by
the Geneva Accords (which Saigon had not signed). He never accepted the
division of his country and his government chose the name of Republic of Việt Nam to
distinguish it from Hồ Chí Minh’s
Socialist Republic of Việt Nam.
THE
CHALLENGES OF NATION BUILDING
As he
assumed the leadership of the First Republic, Diệm was faced with daunting
challenges. During the nearly one
hundred years of French colonialism, Việt Nam had acquired an extensive
administrative, legal and military machinery; these colonial institutions,
however, were created and run by the French solely in the interests of the
French. To turn them into genuinely Vietnamese
institutions was a hard enough task; it was made even harder by the ongoing
communist insurgency and the general instability throughout the country. The withdrawal of more than 100,000 Việt Cộng troops to
the North upon the signing of the 1954 Geneva Accords provided Diệm with some breathing
room and he wanted to take that opportunity to rebuild his shattered nation
morally, politically, militarily and administratively.
INITIATIVES
AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS
In a
relatively short time, President Diệm accomplished a great deal. His
first task was to establish a functioning government to serve the people and
wage a protracted war.
The
Geneva Accords of July 20, 1954 divided Việt Nam at the 17th parallel. The South Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Trần Văn Đổ, refused to
sign the Accords. Following the Geneva conference, the Republic of Việt Nam had an
army of 150,000, 80,000 of whom had to
be demobilized. The referendum of
October 23, 1956 marked the end of the monarchy in Viet Nam and led to the
election of Ngô Đình Diệm as the president of the First Republic of Việt Nam.
In
April 1956, the last French soldier left Vietnamese soil. This was the dawn of a new era, with France
being replaced by the United States.
Washington, as the purveyor of funds, also took control of the war. A new army was born, the largest in South
East Asia. The civil war between the two
Việt Nams would
last three decades, with China, the Soviet Union and the United States pulling
the strings.
Another
urgent task was administrative reform: 13 new ministries were created, in
addition to four offices of governmental delegates and 16 directorates under
the direct control of the President. Administrative reforms included the
establishment of a National School of Administration and the repartition of the
country into provinces. The Chiêu Hồi (Open Arms)
Program, an initiative encouraging defection by the Việt Cộng to the nationalist cause, was
placed under the control of a former Việt Cộng. Agrarian reforms were also introduced (land
redistribution, new agrarian code) to protect and maintain the integrity of
village communities, rightly seen as potentially effective barriers against
communist infiltration. Hidden behind their hedge of bamboo, Vietnamese
villages had always been self-governing and jealously guarded their autonomy.
There is a saying that “The Emperor’s edict stops where the village begins.”
In his
memoirs, CIA director William Colby criticized Washington for its lack of moral
and material support for South Viet Nam’s Strategic Hamlet Program, a plan to fight
communist insurgency by pacifying the countryside and reducing communist
influence among the rural population.
President Diệm was the mastermind of this strategy inspired in part
by Robert Thompson’s experience in Malaysia.
Reinforced by the CIA-led cleanup operation known as the Phoenix
Program, the Strategic Hamlet Program identified and neutralized thousands of
Việt Cộng infiltrators
in the rural South. Documents
declassified after 1975 reveal that cancellation of this program after Diệm’s death was
welcomed by Nguyễn Hữu Thọ, Chairman
of the National Liberation Front, as a “gift from heaven”.
JUDICIAL
AND SOCIAL REFORMS
Bảo Đại had left
behind a nation in ruins. President Diệm understood he
had to re-establish order and the rule of law.
He put in place a new judicial system, with a court of cassation, 2
appeals courts, 6 tribunals of first instance, 23 tribunals with broad
jurisdiction, 13 justice of the peace courts, and 3 tribunals for juvenile
delinquents. There were also 8 labor
courts, 1 agrarian tribunal, 1 administrative tribunal, 2 notary offices, and
several clerk’s offices. The Ministry of Justice recruited and trained new
magistrates and judiciary police officers.
A
national campaign coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of
Social Affairs and the Ministry of Education was launched to eradicate social
ills like theft, gambling, drugs and alcohol.
The
education system was entirely revamped, from primary to university level, and
four new universities were established. Quốc ngữ was made Viet Nam’s official
language, replacing French and Chinese.
To
unify the different systems left behind by the French, new legal codes were
introduced: a nationality code, a penal code, a family code, a commercial code,
and a civil code. These new codes were in line with the principles of freedom
and democracy enshrined in the Constitution.
CIVIL
SERVICE AND POLITICAL PARTIES
Fighting
communist infiltration and countering agitprop activities by the North were
among Diệm’s priorities. CIA official
Edward Lansdale, a friend of Filipino President Magsaysay’s and Diệm’s political
advisor, recommended the creation of a political party loyal to the
president. The Cần Lao party, inspired by French
philosopher Emmanuel Mounier, was thus born, with Diệm’s brother Ngô Đình Nhu as its
theoretician and first secretary. Inside the Cần Lao itself, there were many
factions (Trần Kim Tuyến, Huỳnh Văn Lang, Dương Văn Hiếu, Trần Văn Trai, Đỗ Mậu….). The insertion of the Cần Lao into the
armed forces was the source of great discontent and unrest. A few years later, as a result of pressure
from the public and from the US, a multiparty system was cautiously tested with
the creation of the Revolutionary Patriotic Movement (Phong Trào Cách Mạng Quốc Gia), a
pro-government party. Allowing real
political opposition was seen as too much of a risk during a time of war.
Diệm left it to
his brothers Thục, Nhu and Cẩn, to handle party affairs. He himself preferred to focus on the
political and professional training of the Federation of Revolutionary Civil
Servants (Công Chức Cách Mạng Quốc Gia). Mme Nhu, Nhu’s wife and a member of the
National Assembly, was in charge of the female wing of the civil service. These
women received military training and did social work that included hospital,
hospice and orphanage visits, and teaching of quốc ngữ.
THE
CHINESE PROBLEM
President
Diệm stated in a
speech in Tuy Hòa on 17 September 1955 that political independence had to go
hand in hand with economic independence. At the time, Việt Nam’s economy was dominated by
Chinese nationals. To put an end to this
situation, Diệm introduced draconian measures such as land
redistribution, a marked decrease in the immigration and naturalization quota,
the expulsion of undesirable elements, and a ban on Chinese nationals from
taking up a number of professions. The
Taiwanese government protested these measures and threatened to repatriate the
Taiwanese-born. Washington had to
intervene. A compromise was eventually
agreed upon by Saigon and Taipei. Diệm got some of
what he wanted but not all.
Agrarian Reform
A
complete overhaul of the agrarian system was a priority for Ngô Đình Diệm, a necessary
component of his program to renovate society and combat the Marxist policy of
exploitation of the people. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform was
established in 1955 and Diệm signed a
series of decrees (4 June 1953, 8 January 1955 and 5 February 1955) to regulate
the rights, responsibilities and relations between landowners and agricultural
workers, whose status was defined under the law. Special contracts
were drawn in order to protect the latter. A national census of land that
had been abandoned during the war or was owned by the French was conducted so
official archives could be created and titles drawn. Land redistribution by
local authorities was carried out under strict control, to prevent abuses, and
compensation was scrupulously paid after deduction of the appropriate taxes.
By law, each landowner was limited to a maximum of 100 hectares.
Rural tribunals were established in the main regional centers.
FIVE-YEAR
ECONOMIC PLAN
The
Republic of Việt Nam was recognized by 47 nations and was the
beneficiary of economic aid from the Free World, the United States and member
states of the Colombo Plan. President Diệm was determined to fully utilize
the country’s own resources before resorting to foreign aid. He liked to
say that the best guarantee of political freedom was economic independence.
He therefore created a special office known as General Direction of
Planning, answerable to him. Its main tasks were to draw an inventory of
natural and human resources and to come up with a five-year development plan.
After
five years of hard work, the government was able to list the following among
its achievements: an overhaul of the infrastructure; land clearance in the
border areas and the highlands; the creation of a Center of Atomic Study in
Dalat; the introduction of electricity to rural areas; and the resumption of
rice, coffee and rubber exports. The standard of living improved, the piaster
to dollar exchange rate stabilized, and so did the national budget. Compared
with its South East Asian neighbors, Việt Nam was developing reasonably
well considering it was in the midst of a civil war. In short, the
five-year plan worked. Cement, sugar and fabric factories were
opened and functioned at full capacity. Workers’ rights were
respected and strikes were rare.
ALLIES
AND ENEMIES
The
US-South Việt Nam alliance was fraught with tension. US military, economic and
administrative advisors were everywhere.
Among the staff at the US embassy, USAID (United States Agency for
International Development), USOM (U.S. Operations Mission) and DAO (Defense
Attache Office) as well as among foreign correspondents, there were countless
informants with direct or indirect contact with the CIA. George Carver, Rufus
Phillips, Lucien Conein, John Paul Vann were among the better known.
President
Diệm had his own
circle of advisors whom he’d met in the 40’s, among them Edward Lansdale,
Wesley Fishel, Wolf Landejinsky, Raymond de Jaegher. Some of these turned into fierce critics of
his administration prior to the 1963 coup.
The
North Vietnamese claimed to have penetrated South Vietnamese Command, but that
was an idle boast. Many North Vietnamese and Việt Cộng infiltrators were intercepted
and put on trial in Huế by Ngô Đình Cẩn and in Saigon by the Tổng cuộc Tình báo
Trung ương, the South Vietnamese Central Intelligence Agency (cases of Vũ Ngọc Nhạ, Huỳnh Văn Trọng , Dương Quỳnh Hoa; Morin Hotel; Lê Hữu Thúy, Trần Quốc Hương aka Mười Hương; Phạm Bá
Lương; Ca Văn Thỉnh, Trần Ngọc Hiền….)
Among
the communists who ultimately joined the South Vietnamese cause and were
offered important posts by President Diệm were Kiều Công Cung, Lâm Quang Phòng,
Nguyễn Văn Bé , Phạm Ngọc Thảo.
A MONK
TURNED POLITICIAN
Much
has been written about President Diệm, yet he remains something of an
enigma. He was born on January 3, 1901,
in the Central Viet Nam province of Quảng Bình, the birthplace of
revolutionaries. He was the third in a
Catholic family of 9 children (6 boys, 3 girls). His father Ngô Đình Khả spoke three
languages, was a mandarin and tutor to
Emperor Thành Thái who was known for his hostility to the French, and was the
first Vietnamese to be educated at the Catholic seminary in Penang in present
day Malaysia. Diệm’s childhood was steeped in Christian, Confucian and
Taoist principles. He was nicknamed “Mr No” by his compatriots for steadfastly
turning down all offers to cooperate with the French. After his election as
president, he moved into the sumptuous Independence Palace but chose for
himself a modest apartment with just a couple of chairs, a table, and a bed
without a mattress. This is where he
would eat his meals alone and where his ministers and officers would come to
submit their reports. Ceremonial rooms
were used only for official occasions like state visits and presentations of
diplomatic credentials.
President
Diệm was always
dressed in a white sharkskin suit and black tie. At weekends he would relax and wear a black
Vietnamese tunic to go riding on Palace grounds or take pictures with his
Rolleiflex or Leica. He rarely lost his
temper, but when he did, he struck fear in his orderly officers’ hearts. He would occasionally invite them to share
his modest meals of soup and vegetables.
He
would rise early in the morning and attend alone in his private chapel a mass
officiated by his chaplain. Often he
would invite one of his ministers or some expert to come over for talks late
into the night. These would frequently
turn into endless, and sometimes incoherent, presidential monologues. He would take a few quick puffs on a Mitac
cigarette before extinguishing it.
Almost
every week, he would go on some trip to the border provinces or the highlands
to inspect his Agroville pet program. For the occasion, he would wear his old
Mossant felt hat and leather boots. Although a small man, he walked fast and
his bodyguards had a hard time keeping up with him.
THE
COLLAPSE OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC
Under
Ngô Đình Diệm’s leadership, South Việt Nam enjoyed a period of
relative peace, reconstruction and prosperity from 1954 to 1960. During that
time, North Việt Nam endured the trauma of the agrarian reform and
cultural revolution, which caused
starvation and untold misery. All was not well between Saigon and
Washington however. Misunderstandings
and disagreements arose over economic aid and the growing US military and
civilian presence. Washington was aware
of Diệm’s
non-negotiable stand on sovereignty and was in no hurry to help him create an
effective armed force. All paramilitary
forces, national security, civilian guard, village guard, police, security,
prison administration, espionage and counter-insurgency, were placed under the
responsibility of the Interior Ministry at the request of the US. Requests for
weaponry were often declined by Ambassador Elbridge Dubrow or granted sparingly
or with strict conditions attached. Relations with the US State Department went
from bad to worse, with a brief respite during the mandate of Ambassador
Nolting. The arrival of “Proconsul”
Henry Cabot Lodge marked the final step of the plot against Diệm and Nhu. Following the Bay of Pigs Invasion, President
Kennedy gave free reins to he virulently anti-Diệm lobby in the State Department
led by Averell Harriman, Hillsman et al who set out to isolate, and eventually
eliminate Diệm and Nhu. Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ, Trần Văn Chương, Bửu Hội and even Nguyễn Đình Thuần were openly
courted to replace Diệm.
Few
families paid a heavier price than the Ngô Đình in the fight against
colonialism and communism in Viet Nam.
Ngô Đình Khả, the patriarch, was a devout Catholic and
an ardent opponent of the French. His oldest
son, Ngô Đình Khôi, and Khôi’s son, Ngô Đình Huân, were both killed in the
early days of the Marxist uprising.
President Diệm and his brothers Nhu and Cẩn were killed during the 1963
coup. Archbishop Ngô Đình Thục, their older
brother, was excommunicated by the Vatican after 1975, then pardoned, and died
in a retirement home in Springfield, Missouri in 1984. Madame Ngô Đình Nhu, née Trần Lệ Xuân, lived in
a modest apartment in Paris after 1985 and passed away in 2011. Tragedy continued to pursue the family. Madame Nhu’s parents, ambassador Trần Văn Chương
and his wife Thân Thị Nam Trân, were killed by their son Trần Văn Khiêm in
their home in Washington. Madame Nhu’s
daughters, Ngô Đình Lệ Thủy and Ngô Đình Lệ Quyên both died in automobile
accidents in Europe.
The
bond between the five Ngô brothers was sorely tested during Diệm’s
presidency. He ordered Ngô Đình Cẩn’s office in
Huế closed. When I consulted Diệm on major issues, he would refer
me to Nhu, who lost patience one day and exclaimed that “The President is an
administrator, not a politician!” There
were rumblings that Diệm should make way for Nhu, the unofficial
president. Bishop Thục and Mme Nhu’s
growing intervention in political affairs was criticized by the opposition,
exploited by the communists, and
described by the Americans as nepotism.
Ironically, at the same time in the US, President Kennedy’s brother
Robert played a prominent role in his administration. JFK was assassinated in 1963, 11 days after
Diệm, and Robert
Kennedy was assassinated in 1968.
The
Americans were Diệm’s real enemy, because they controlled the purse and
behind the scenes negotiated with Moscow and Beijing. Politically, South Việt Nam was disadvantaged by the
fact that there was no mutual security treaty and the absence of an effective
lobby in the US. The situation was
deteriorating rapidly. Inside the country, the Buddhist crisis was worsening,
the Caravelle opposition group was becoming increasingly vocal, the National
Liberation Front was getting stronger, and the CIA was infiltrating the army
ahead of a coup. Việt Nam’s neighbors got drawn into the conflict in spite
of their stated neutrality. The North
Vietnamese started providing logistical support to the National Liberation
Front via the Hồ Chí Minh Trail which went through Cambodia and Laos,
with the Khmer government providing asylum to the National Liberation Front.
In an
attempt to make President Diệm face reality, I teamed up with my three colleagues
from Defence, Trần Trung Dung, Information, Trần Chánh Thành, and Justice, Nguyễn Văn Sĩ, to order the arrest of
a number of Cần Lao members accused of illegal activities. This resulted in a reorganization of the
Cabinet and the four of us resigned from our respective posts. Four months later, on November 1, 1960, Vương
Văn Đông and Nguyễn Chánh Thi
launched a military coup which failed.
Between
the First Republic (Ngô Đình Diệm, 1954-1963) and the Second
Republic (Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, 1967-1975) came an interregnum
of great instability marked by military coups and counter-coups. Faced with a
passive defense strategy, the South Vietnamese Army was not allowed to cross
the 17th Parallel and invade the North.
For a decade, the US used South Việt Nam as a pawn
on the Cold War chessboard. The RVN reluctantly played the game. This proxy war between the two Việt Nams gave the
other South East Asian countries the “decent interval” they needed to rearm.
Once its objective was reached, the US abandoned South Việt Nam to its
fate. The deaths of Diệm and Nhu will forever be a stain on US history. Geopolitics often gives rise to unbalanced
alliances, and the smaller partner always loses. Without the consent and
support of the people, any foreign alliance, however strong, will eventually
fall apart.
For
General Dương Văn Minh, the coup against Diệm was the golden opportunity to
get rid of all remaining evidence of his appropriation of the Bình Xuyên loot,
which I had been instructed by Nhu to investigate in late 1957. In 2011, in a private meeting in Houston,
Texas, former president Nguyễn Văn Thiệu told me that the generals
involved in the coup of November 1, 1963, made plans to flee to Cambodia when
they heard that Diệm had left Gia Long Palace. Diệm ultimately decided to surrender
in order to avoid further fighting and weakening of the army, placing the
well-being of the country above his own security. When the time came for Thiệu to do the
same, he chose his own survival.
In his
memoirs “Việt Nam, Our Endless War”, General Trần Văn Đôn admitted to receiving
the paltry sum of US$ 42,000 from CIA agent Lucien Conein to share between the
coup leaders, most of whom were among Diệm’s trusted officers (“thugs”,
Lyndon Johnson called them).
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
A
number of historians argue that the US did not lose the war in Việt Nam. It got what
it wanted, which was to loosen
the viselike grip of Moscow and Beijing, but at what cost? The defeat in Việt Nam did not occur on the
battlefield, but on political and moral grounds. The war did not have to be lost.
At the
time of Diệm’s death in 1963, the Vietnamese armed forces, trained by the US, were
about 255,000 strong. In 1975, that
number was one million. Of these, it is estimated that 259,000 died, 567,000
were injured, 34,000 went missing. 58,200
US troops died, 153,400 were injured, 1,700 went missing. The figures for South
Korea were 5,100 dead and 1,000 injured; for Australia 430 dead and 2,900
injured; for Thailand 350 dead and 1,300 injured; and for New Zealand 60 dead
and 210 injured. It is estimated that 3 million Việt Cộng died during
this war. General Nguyễn Hộ, one of the
leaders of the Liberation Front, put the total number of casualties in both
north and south at 11 million.
To
date, the US does not seem to have learned from its experience in Việt Nam. Its troops are mired in Afghanistan and Iraq
and its strategists do not know how to deal with the Taliban. Its record as the world policeman
is poor, not to mention controversial.
Democracy cannot be exported. It
has to be chosen freely, customized and in harmony with the prevailing
culture. In the same way that there’s
fake currency, there can be fake democracies.
Diệm and Thiệu
underestimated the power and influence of the media on the executive and
legislative branches of the US.
As
demonstrated by a belated United Nations investigation, accusations of
corruption and religious persecution aimed at Diệm have turned out to be false.
His case demands to be revisited. He was a true patriot and a die-hard opponent
of Marxism. He made mistakes, certainly,
but he was the architect of his country and left behind a series of initiatives
that the Vietnamese people can be proud of.
He created a new Việt Nam and the accomplishments of his First Republic
made it possible for the establishment of the Second Republic.
Without
the coup of 1 November 1963 which ended with Diệm’s death, the fall of Saigon in
April 1975 and the ensuing exodus would not have happened. In 1972, after US troops had withdrawn, South
Việt Nam proved it
could win on its own when it pushed back a massive communist advance. This
victory was negated in 1975. The US was
involved in a war it was not committed to winning, and General Westmoreland
publicly recognized that “We betrayed you.”
The
struggle continues today to end Marxist dictatorship. In recent years, this has
been made more difficult by China’s growing territorial ambitions. The Free
World will never get out of the Vietnamese impasse as long as it does not learn
that most important of lessons, that nothing can be accomplished without the
power of the people.
Huntington
Beach, July 4, 2016
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Thành tích sáu năm hoạt động chính phủ Nam Cộng hòa, Saigon, 1960, Viet Nam Press
Niên Lịch Công Dân,
Journal Officiel, VNCH, 1960-1961
BIOGRAPHY
Born
18 May, 1923 in Cần Thơ, Việt Nam.
Bachelor
of Law & Hautes Etudes de Droit, University of Law, Hà Nội, Việt Nam.
JD,
Western State University, California.
President
of the Court of Appeals, Saigon before being appointed Interior Minister in Ngô
Đình Diệm’s cabinet (1957-1960).
Ambassador
of the Republic of Việt Nam to Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq &
Jordan, Chargé de Mission to the Vatican and Israel (1960-1964).
Attorney
at law, Saigon (1965-April 1975).
Professor
at the National Institute of Administration, Saigon.
Professor
at Faculty of Political Sciences, Dalat University, Việt Nam (1969-1975).
Evacuated
to California, April 1975.
Eminence
Teaching Credential in California.
Nominated California 1989 Americanization Teacher of the Year
(Sacramento Department of Education).
Editor
in chief & Publisher of the French-English Human Rights-Droits de l’Homme
Quarterly since 1994.
General
Delegate of the Alliance Francophone (OIF), USA.
Advisor
of the Human Rights Network California & the Institute of Vietnamese
Studies, California.
Producer VN Oral History Series,
Little SaigonTV Station, California.
